Muslim Youth Unemployment and Expat Jihadism - Bored to Death?

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Abstract

While the presence of foreign fighters in military conflict has been a regular ingredient of jihad, never before in modern history have foreign fighters gathered at the scale and speed as they have in the territory of the so-called Islamic State. As the foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq pose severe security risks for the sender countries, especially from battlefield returnees and lone-wolf sympathizers, it becomes imperative to better understand the push factors of expat jihadism. Empirical studies of these factors are still scarce and often generate contradicting results. The objective of our paper is to contribute to the emerging discussion of the push factors of expat jihadism and to complement the findings of the few empirical studies already conducted. Contrary to other studies, we provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that Muslim youth unemployment is a driver of expat jihadism not only for the Arab world, but globally.

Keywords: Terrorism, youth unemployment, expat jihadism, Tobit model.

JEL Classification:
D74 Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions
F51 International Conflicts • Negotiations • Sanctions
F52 National Security • Economic Nationalism
H56 National Security and War
J61 Geographic Labor Mobility • Immigrant Workers

Executive Takeaways

- Expat jihadism is an increasing threat to homeland security.
- Monitoring expat jihadism can serve as an early-warning system for homeland security.
- Fighting youth unemployment among Muslim populations key to reduce expat jihadism.
- Security cooperation to reduce expat jihadism should include economic cooperation.

1. Introduction

The presence of foreign fighters in military conflict has been a regular ingredient of jihad (Dragon, 2015). In the 1980s, foreigners flocked to Afghanistan to fight alongside the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan war. The same, albeit to a lesser extent, could be observed in Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s and again following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Nevertheless, the Syrian civil war and the rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) have broken new ground. Never before in modern history have foreign fighters gathered at the scale and speed as they have in the territory of the IS (Hegghammer, 2013; Lang & Al Wari, 2016).

Since the outbreak of the 2010 Arab uprising and the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, tens of thousands of fighters from a multitude of countries have joined the IS and other extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. The majority of foreign fighters come from Arab states, mainly Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. However, a significant number of foreign fighters also come from Western countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, along with former Soviet Union states such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan (The Soufan Group, 2015).

The foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq involves severe security risks to the sender countries. Expat jihadists who have supported military, paramilitary, and terrorist operations on the ground may continue their fight as returnees against targets in their homeland. It has been estimated that almost 30 percent of European Union citizens who joined the fight in Syria have returned home (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016). Thomas Hegghammer, Director of Terrorism Research at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment in Oslo and cited in (Gardner, 2013), suggests that "Syria will prolong the problem of jihadi terrorism in Europe by 20 years" and that attacks by foreign fighter returnees are "almost inevitable."

With this security risk in mind, it becomes imperative to better understand the factors behind the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. So far, the literature has produced mixed results regarding the push factors of expat jihadism. Some studies argue that they have their origin in economic grievance, others deny such a relationship. Empirical studies are generally still scarce. The objective of our paper is therefore to contribute to the emerging discussion of the push factors of expat jihadism and to complement the findings of the few empirical studies already conducted.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the relevant literature. We present our data and methodology in section three. A discussion of our empirical findings follows in section four. We conclude with a summary of our main results and outlook in section five.

2. Literature Review

Research on the causes of expat jihadism spans all social sciences, including sociology, social psychology, anthropology, political science, and economics. Clearly, a thorough understanding of what drives foreigners into third country conflict zones is a puzzle that only can be put together if attention is given to all those pieces.

Skidmore (2014) proposes that some identity with the conflict serves as a magnet for foreign fighters into Syria. This conflict identity could be the sectarian nature of the Syrian Sunni-Shiite conflict, the persisting effect of previous conflicts in nearby countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, and failing U.S. policies toward the ongoing conflict. Push factors existing in the fighters' home countries that may have been key determinants in their radicalization and recruitment are not discussed.

Other studies argue that explanatory factors behind the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria are not systematic, but highly variable, coincidental and even random. Lorenzo Vidino, a visiting fellow at the RAND Corporation and cited in (Helfont, 2011) argues that "the whole experience of foreign fighters is often shaped by coincidences largely beyond the control of the 'wannabe' foreign fighter." Such coincidences may be social, cultural, and economic events that foreign fighters were exposed to prior to leaving their home. Likewise, Cilluffo et al. (2010) state that, "there is no single pathway to becoming a foreign fighter, nor is there a static profile of the fighters themselves. Ideology, social circumstances, adventure seeking, political grievances, and so on, all appear to impact individuals' choices in this regard. Foreign fighters' socioeconomic circumstances also appear to be highly variable" (2010, p. 36).

Duyvesteyn and Peeters (2015) use comparative case studies to investigate why the conflict in Syria attract more foreigners willing to fight without substantial pay and without any apparent link to the conflict other than religious affinity with the Muslim side. The authors claim that the diverging levels of Muslim foreign fighter recruitment in the most recent conflicts, including the one in Syria, can largely be explained by three factors: access to the battlefront, internal cohesion or group unity, and chances of success. They argue that all three factors are relevant to explain the record number of foreign fighters in Syria, as access to the Syrian battlefront was significantly easy. Once present on the ground, the chances of success were high as the IS was actively realizing the reestablishment of the Caliphate (2015, p. 26). Interestingly, the authors also note that in reality rebel and opposition groups lack internal cohesion. Nevertheless, IS propaganda was relatively successful in luring people into jihad with brotherly war romanticism.

Using a series of correlations, Verwimp (2015) shows that a positive correlation exists between the gap in employment and education between first and second generation migrants and non-migrants on the one hand and the number of Syria fighters per million inhabitants on the other hand in a sample of European countries. Examining factors associated with Islamist violence in

OECD countries as well as in Syria, Thomas (2015) finds that OECD countries appear to experience Islamist violence as a result of large numbers of economically and socially segregated immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. These immigrants do not benefit from the relatively high living standards, or levels of equality in their host countries. Consequently, more of them radicalize and participate in Islamist violence, either in Syria or in their new home. Moreover, the author shows that, for all non-OECD countries, stronger civil liberties appear to decrease both Islamist domestic violence and the outflow of foreign fighters to Syria. This finding coincides with those of Krueger (2006, p. 3), who reports that countries with low levels of civil liberties or political rights are likely to have more of their citizens join the Iraqi insurgency.

On the other hand, Benmelech and Klor (2016) find that poor aggregate economic conditions are not a major determinant of expat jihadism. The authors conclude that "in contrast to conjectures made recently by economists and policy makers, economic conditions are not the root causes of the global phenomenon of ISIS foreign fighters. In fact, many foreign fighters originate from countries with high levels of economic development, low income inequality, and highly developed political institutions" (p. 11). The authors also take special issue with the fact that so many foreign fighters come from Western European countries, arguing that if "poverty and lack of social equality are not to blame, then why are Western European countries disproportionately significant sources of ISIS foreign fighters? The reason lies in other country characteristics: they are ethnically and linguistically homogenous. In fact, the more homogenous the host country is, the greater difficulty immigrants such as Muslims from the Middle East experience in assimilating. As other research has shown, isolation induces some of them to become radicalized" (p. 11).

Our paper is methodologically closest to Benmelech and Klor (2016), but we challenge their finding to rule out unemployment as a factor of expat jihadism. The authors argue that "income inequality, unemployment, and social and political conditions are not determinants of joining ISIS in non-Muslim countries" (p. 9). While the authors obtain in their empirical results some positive correlation between unemployment and the number of foreign fighters, they argue that "ISIS foreign fighters per Muslim residents is (…) not highly correlated with unemployment" (p. 7), and that the "positive correlation between unemployment and ISIS foreign fighters (…) is driven entirely by Muslim countries" (p. 8).

In this paper we argue that if one focuses on youth unemployment, instead of general unemployment, and interacts youth unemployment with the Muslim population share, the variable becomes a meaningful proxy for the variables discussed in the literature such as conflict identity, alienation, and lack of assimilation. This variable is also very robust in alternative specifications.

3. Theoretical Framework, Data and Methodology

According to Peter Neuman (2015), Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), a research center of the Department of War Studies in the King's College of London, fighters from fifty countries have joined Sunni militant organizations in Syria and Iraq. Table 1, which summarizes the sending countries by regions, shows that the vast majority of foreign fighter sending countries are located in the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe (especially the Balkans) and Central Asia, and Western Europe. Table 2 lists the 50 foreign fighter sending countries and the number of foreign fighters per million inhabitants.

Table 1: Foreign Fighter Sending Countries in Syria and Iraq

East Asia and the Pacific (n=3)	Eastern Europe and Central Asia (n=12)	Middle East and North Africa (n=14)	North America (n=2)	South Asia (n=2)	Sub Saharan Africa (n=2)	Western Europe (n=15)
• Australia • China • New Zealand	• Albania • Bosnia • Kazakhstan • Kosovo • Kyrgyzstan • Macedonia • Russia • Serbia • Tajikistan • Turkmenistan • Ukraine • Uzbekistan	• Algeria • Bahrain • Egypt • Israel/Palest. Territories • Jordan • Kuwait • Lebanon • Libya • Morocco • Qatar • Saudi-Arabia • Tunisia • United Arab Emirates • Yemen	• Canada • United States of America	• Afghanistan • Pakistan	• Somalia • Sudan	• Austria • Belgium • Denmark • Finland • France • Germany • Ireland • Italy • Netherlands • Norway • Spain • Sweden • Switzerland • United Kingdom • Turkey

Source: Neumann, P. (2015).

What push factors drive foreign fighters into Syria? A theoretical framework for such a decision may be found in a simple time allocation model. Assume a representative expat jihadist has the standard Cobb-Douglas utility function

$$U(C, J) = C^{\alpha} J^{1-\alpha} \qquad (1)$$

where

C = consumption good and

J = time spent on jihadist activity and

α and $(1-\alpha)$ = the utility elasticities of C and J, respectively.

We think of the time spent on jihadist activities as a spectrum that ranges from, for example, reading about jihadist ideology on the internet to actually preparing for jihadism. The first requires

very little time allocation, the latter a lot. The more time a jihadist chooses to allocate towards jihadist activity, the more likely this activity is concerned with preparations to become a foreign fighter.

In our simple model, the consumption function depends on exogenously determined available employment opportunities, *E*, and the time spent on jihadist activity, *J*. The amount of available employment opportunities has two effects on the representative jihadist's consumption possibility frontier. More employment opportunities increase both consumption opportunities and the opportunity cost of time spent on jihadist activity. This idea can be written as

$$C = E - \frac{E}{1-E} J \qquad (2)$$

We assume that employment opportunities can be expressed on a scale between $0<E<1$. This implies that as *E* approaches zero, the time available for jihadist activities becomes theoretically infinite. The closer *E* is to one, the closer the economy can be thought of as operating on its production possibility frontier.

Substituting (2) in (1) and maximizing for the optimum jihadist time allocation, J^*, yields

$$J^* = (1-E)(1-\alpha) \qquad (3)$$

which shows that more employment opportunities reduce the optimum time allocated to jihadist activities.

Unfortunately, data on youth unemployment among the Muslim population is not available for a large sample of Western countries. Yet, there is sufficient evidence from case studies that youth unemployment is not only highest among Arab countries in general, but that Muslim youth unemployment is also regularly above the national average in Western countries. According to a report by The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) based on census data from 2001 and 2011, Muslims have a higher rate of unemployment than the average, despite an increased level of education over the ten years. Almost half of the British Muslim population resides in the bottom 10% local authority districts for deprivation. Moreover, the report points out to the high proportion of the Muslim prison population (13%) and the proportion of Muslims in social housing (28%) as a cause for concern (Ridley, 2015). In the period from 2010 to 2015, the number of young people from ethnic minority backgrounds, mostly Muslims, who have been unemployed for more than a year has risen by almost 50%, according to figures released by the Labour Party (Taylor, 2015).

In 1999, when the general unemployment rate in France was around 10%, it was more than double at 22%, among immigrants (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 2003). In 2009, the "Sensitive Urban Zones", where many immigrants reside, had an unemployment rate around 18.6% compared to a national average of 9.8%; for young people in those neighborhoods, the rate reached 43%, contributing to a strong feeling of discrimination (Kepel, 2011). In a study following immigrant families over several generations, Maxwell (2009)

shows the persistence of high unemployment among North Africans in France: up to 28%, with second-generation Muslims more affected than their parents (30% compared to 22%; but most of the parents' generation is already retired).

The situation is no different in the Netherlands where ethnic minorities suffer from higher unemployment rates than the average Dutch population. In 2009, when the overall rate of unemployment was 5% in the Netherlands, Dutch Muslim minority suffered from an 11% unemployment rate. This breaks down to 10% for Turks, and 12% for Moroccans. As for the general population, youths are hit especially hard by unemployment, at over 20% for 15-25 year-olds. Even more problematically, there has been an upward trend in minority youth unemployment in the last decade, and the second generation experiences even more difficulties than their immigrant parents (FORUM, 2009).

Consequently, if we accept that, on average, youth unemployment is higher among Muslims, then the interaction term of youth unemployment with the Muslim population share becomes a meaningful proxy for the lack of assimilation among young Muslims.

Table 2: Foreign Fighters per Million (FFperMill) Inhabitants

Country	WB Code	FFperMill	Country	WB Code	FFperMill
Afghanistan	AFG	1.58	Macedonia	MKD	5.78
Albania	ALB	31.09	Morocco	MAR	44.22
Algeria	DZA	5.14	Netherlands	NLD	13.35
Australia	AUS	7.45	New Zealand	NZL	1.33
Austria	AUT	14.65	Norway	NOR	11.68
Bahrain	BHR	8.81	Pakistan	PAK	2.7
Belgium	BEL	39.2	Qatar	QAT	6.91
Bosnia	BIH	86.44	Russia	RUS	8
Canada	CAN	2.81	Saudi-Arabia	SAU	64.75
China	CHN	0.22	Serbia	SRB	8.42
Denmark	DNK	22.16	Somalia	SOM	6.66
Egypt	EGY	4.02	Spain	ESP	1.62
Finland	FIN	10.98	Sudan	SDN	2.54
France	FRA	18.12	Sweden	SWE	17.03
Germany	DEU	6.8	Switzerland	CHE	4.88
Ireland	IRL	6.5	Tajikistan	TJK	22.9
Israel/Palest. Territories	WBG	27.94	Tunisia	TUN	204.61
Italy	ITA	1.3	Turkey	TUR	7.9
Jordan	JOR	227.03	Turkmenistan	TKM	67.83
Kazakhstan	KAZ	14.46	Ukraine	UKR	1.1
Kosovo	KSV	68.56	United Arab Emirates	ARE	1.65
Kuwait	KWT	18.65	United Kingdom	GBR	8.53
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	17.14	United States of America	USA	0.31
Lebanon	LBN	197.94	Uzbekistan	UZB	16.26
Libya	LBY	95.86	Yemen	YEM	4.2

Source: Neumann, P. (2015).

Like Benmelech and Klor (2016), we also control for other socioeconomic characteristics. Our control variables are: Gross Domestic Product per capita, Gini index, the share of manufactures and services as a percentage of GDP, the Polity score, an indicator of good governance, and

regional fixed effects. Under the general hypothesis that economic grievance serves as a push factor of expat jihadism, we expect that, holding everything else constant, on-average richer, more equitable, more economically diversified, more democratic, and better governed countries push less citizens into jihad. Our hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Hypothesis Table (Dependent Variable = Foreign Fighters per One Million Inhabitants)

Independent Variable	GDP per Capita	Interaction of Muslim Population with Youth Unemployment	Youth Unemployment	Income Inequality (Gini)	Manufactures and Services Export Share (% GDP)	Polity Score (Democracy)	Good Governance
Expected Sign	-	+	+	+	-	-	-

Table 4 describes the variables that we use for our empirical analysis, their abbreviation, and sources. For those variables whose distributional characteristics could be improved through data manipulations, we also indicate the nature of the transformation.

Table 4: Description of Data

Variable Name	**Abbreviation**	**Transformation**	**Source**
Foreign Fighters (per Million)	FF	ln(FF/Pop×1000000+1)	Neumann, P. (2005) and World Bank Development Indicator Database.
Youth unemployment rate	yuer	ln(yuer)	World Bank Development Indicators
Muslim population (% total)	Muslim	n/a	Association of Religion Data Archives (online).
Interaction term of Muslim population and youth unemployment rate	musXyuer	ln(muslim*yuer+1)	Association of Religion Data Archives (online) and World Bank Development Indicator Database.
Interaction term of youth unemployment rate and Arab country dummy	arabXyuer	ln(arabXyuer+1)	World Bank Development Indicator Database.
GDP per capita ($2005)	y	ln(y)	World Bank Development Indicator Database.
Gini Index	Gini	n/a	World Bank Development Indicator Database.
Manufacturing and services export (% GDP)	MSExpShr	ln(MSExpShr+1)	Calculated from World Bank Development Indicator Database using the variables Merchandise exports by the reporting economy (current US$), Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports), Service exports (BoP, current US$), and GDP (current US$).
Polity IV Score	Polity	n/a	Center for Systemic Peace
Good Governance	GovX	Simple arithmetic mean of the indicators Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.	World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Population	Pop	n/a	World Bank Development Indicator Database.

Lastly, Table 5 provides summary statistics for our variables. While we use in the regression transformed variables as described in Table 4, the summary statistics of Table 5 are based on non-transformed values.

Table 5: Summary Statistics of Variables (n=134)

Variable	Sample	Mean	Median	Min	Max	Std. Dev.	IQR
FFperMill	All	6.41	0.00	0.00	227.03	25.13	1.08
	FFCtry=0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	FFCtry=1	23.86	7.83	0.22	226.81	44.41	13.97
yuer	All	18.08	14.95	0.7	57.9	12.69	14.38
	FFCtry=0	16.29	11.95	0.7	53.2	11.6	13.75
	FFCtry=1	22.96	19.6	3.5	54.4	14.32	16.15
Muslim	All	25.75	5.05	0.1	99.9	36.58	41.53
	FFCtry=0	20.59	3.35	0.1	99.6	32.62	22.63
	FFCtry=1	39.71	6.75	0.8	99.1	43.15	91.5
y	All	9,511	3,333	153	82,960	15,092	8,205
	FFCtry=0	5,533	2,065	153	82,807	10,090	5,743
	FFCtry=1	20340.32	6212.41	507	66,721	20,454	36,613
Gini	All	38.77	37.63	16.64	63.38	8.53	11.62
	FFCtry=0	40.86	41.99	16.64	46.74	8.57	12.46
	FFCtry=1	33.08	32.81	24.55	19.5	5.23	6.88
MSExpShr	All	21.83	12.8	0.29	157.57	23.82	25.79
	FFCtry=0	20.52	11.02	0.29	157.27	24.85	23.5
	FFCtry=1	25.4	23.77	1.9	88.77	20.68	25.23
Polity	All	5.2	7	-9	10	5.29	7
	FFCtry=0	5.23	7	-9	19	4.99	6
	FFCtry=1	5.11	8.5	-8	18	6.12	10
GovX	All	-0.14	-0.33	-1.69	1.85	0.88	1.29
	FFCtry=0	-0.29	-0.38	-1.69	3.39	0.72	0.93
	FFCtry=1	0.27	-0.09	-1.62	3.46	1.14	2.16

For our final dataset, we only include country observations without any missing values in any of our variables. The total number of observations is n=134. Out of these 134 observations, 36 are foreign fighter countries in the Neumann (2015) dataset. Table 6 summarizes the regional decomposition of our dataset. The full dataset is available in the appendix.

Even though our empirical approach is very close to Benmelech and Klor (2016), our dataset is slightly different. We use the Neuman (2015) dataset, which we found more convenient to work with. Benmelech and Klor (2016), on the other hand, use data from the Soufan Group (2015). Both sources also refer to each other and provide similar data. We calculated the correlation between the foreign fighter numbers in our dataset and the Soufan Group numbers and obtained a Pearson correlation coefficient of r=0.77. A second difference could be that our dataset includes less

foreign fighter countries than Benmelech and Klor (2016). In every model specification, we always have 36 foreign fighter countries and 98 non-foreign fighter countries. Out of the 50 countries listed in Table 2, we lost 14 observations due to missing values of at least one of our right-hand-side variables. We cannot rule out that compared to our specifications, the variable selection of Benmelech and Klor (2016) salvaged more foreign fighter observations, which is why our study is not necessarily suitable for a direct comparison with theirs. Our study should be seen as an alternative view on a similar question.

Table 6: Regional Composition of Observations

	Middle East And North Africa (Arab)	East Asia and the Pacific	Eastern Europe and Central Asia	Latin America and the Caribbean	North America	South Asia	Sub Saharan Africa	Western Europe	Total
FF Country	6	2	10	0	2	1	1	14	36
No FF Country	4	11	16	23	0	4	36	4	98
Grand Total	10	13	26	23	2	5	37	18	134

Because our data is left-censored with 98 countries which have sent zero foreign fighters while the observations for those countries that sent foreign fighters are continuous, we had to choose between a Tobit and a Heckit model. Heckit is often deemed superior to Tobit if there are different underlying variables for explaining non-zero observations and the magnitude of the non-zero observations. This is not the case for our question. Youth unemployment can be assumed to explain both the decision to become an expat jihadist and the magnitude of a country's expat jihadism. We therefore employ a simple Tobit (Tobit 1) model. We run our regression using the open source software model "gretl," whose accompanying manual also provides a technical description of the Tobit estimator.

4. Empirical Results

In order to be prepared for eventual multicollinearity problems, we first present in Table 7 a Pearson correlation matrix for our right-hand-side variables (using the transformed variables as described in Table 4). As the correlation matrix shows, our key variable "musXyuer" (the interaction term of Muslim population and youth unemployment rate) is not strongly correlated with any of the other explanatory variables (which are not part of the interaction term). We therefore do not expect non-significance or unexpected signs for the "musXyuer" variable due to multicollinearity.

Table 7: Correlation Matrix

	musXyuer(ln)	Muslim	yuer(ln)	Arab	yuerXarab(ln)	y(ln)	Gini	MSExpShr(ln)	Polity	GovX	EAP	EECA	LAC	SA	SSA
musXyuer(ln)	1.00														
Muslim	0.80	1.00													
yuer(ln)	0.31	0.07	1.00												
Arab	0.42	0.51	0.25	1.00											
arabXyuer(ln)	0.42	0.51	0.25	1.00	1.00										
y(ln)	-0.19	-0.35	0.38	-0.09	-0.09	1.00									
Gini	-0.23	-0.19	-0.10	-0.13	-0.13	-0.30	1.00								
MSExpShr(ln)	-0.24	-0.35	0.23	-0.09	-0.09	0.58	-0.31	1.00							
Polity	-0.33	-0.44	0.16	-0.33	-0.33	0.46	0.00	0.35	1.00						
GovX	-0.28	-0.44	0.20	-0.25	-0.25	0.84	-0.28	0.62	0.64	1.00					
EAP	-0.15	-0.11	-0.24	-0.09	-0.09	0.00	0.02	0.17	-0.07	0.01	1.00				
EECA	-0.02	-0.01	0.27	-0.13	-0.13	0.13	-0.44	0.32	0.00	0.06	-0.16	1.00			
LAC	-0.48	-0.30	-0.04	-0.12	-0.12	0.06	0.52	-0.10	0.20	-0.05	-0.15	-0.22	1.00		
SA	0.09	0.09	-0.11	-0.05	-0.05	-0.16	-0.13	-0.05	0.00	-0.13	-0.06	-0.10	-0.09	1.00	
SSA	0.21	0.16	-0.29	-0.10	-0.10	-0.61	0.29	-0.53	-0.23	-0.39	-0.20	-0.30	-0.28	-0.12	1.00

Table 8 shows the Tobit regression results for various specifications. The results indicate that the interaction variable of the percentage share of the Muslim population with youth unemployment is highly significant across all countries. The "musXyuer" variable also always carries the expected positive sign. This is even the case if we control for Arab youth unemployment and youth unemployment in general. Once it is controlled for the interaction of youth unemployment with the Muslim population share, neither youth unemployment nor the Muslim population share is significant.

We therefore do not arrive at the same conclusion as Benmelech and Klor (2016) who conclude that the unemployment problem behind expat jihadism is driven by Arab countries exclusively. Instead, based on our sample and regression results, we would argue that youth unemployment among the Muslim population is an explanatory factor of expat jihadism worldwide. In fact, after controlling for the interaction term of youth unemployment and the Muslim population share, youth unemployment in the Arab world (arabXyuer) as a separate explanatory variable is not significant in any specification and even regularly carries an unexpected negative sign.

A variance inflation test conducted on Model VI indicates possible multicollinearity problems between the Arab dummy and the "arabXyuer" interaction term. We then also ran Model VI without the Arab dummy and obtained a positive coefficient of 0.554 with a p-value of 0.08. From a global perspective, the well-known Arab youth unemployment problem is therefore a weakly

significant determinant of expat jihadism, but does not override the significance of the "musXyuer" interaction term.

Table 8: Tobit Regression Results

DV: lnFFperMill

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
const	-16.577 (3.07)***	-8.886 (3.288)***	-9.01 (3.198)***	-9.658 (3.291)***	-8.36 (4.036)**	-2.697 (5.078)
musXyuer(ln)	0.787 (0.296)***	0.913 (0.31)***	0.93 (0.3)***	0.934 (0.3)***	0.924 (0.297)***	0.998 (0.274)***
Muslim	0.012 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)	0 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.01 (0.015)
yuer(ln)	-0.365 (0.556)	-0.379 (0.539)	-0.519 (0.53)	-0.459 (0.53)	-0.388 (0.54)	-0.868 (0.553)
Arab	8.603 (10.873)	13.762 (10.221)	13.95 (9.957)	13.532 (9.867)	13.341 (9.797)	12.768 (9.097)
arabXyuer(ln)	-2.136 (3.228)	-3.662 (3.031)	-3.703 (2.952)	-3.655 (2.925)	-3.6 (2.904)	-3.252 (2.724)
lny	1.46 (0.27)***	1.152 (0.256)***	1.029 (0.258)***	1.113 (0.271)***	0.944 (0.412)**	0.317 (0.479)
Gini		-0.145 (0.047)***	-0.137 (0.046)***	-0.136 (0.046)***	-0.132 (0.046)***	-0.051 (0.05)
MSExpShr(ln)			0.423 (0.313)	0.477 (0.314)	0.441 (0.318)	-0.073 (0.339)
Polity				-0.067 (0.056)	-0.085 (0.066)	-0.084 (0.064)
GovX					0.375 (0.717)	1.313 (0.759)*
EAP						-0.814 (1.085)
EECA						1.048 (0.893)
LAC						-8.846 (1971.55)
SA						-0.581 (1.578)
SSA						-3.06 (1.423)**
OLS Adj. R2	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.36	0.37	0.42
Log-Likelihood	-104.86	-99.12	-98.22	-97.49	-97.36	-91.1
Left-censored	98	98	98	98	98	98
n	134	134	134	134	134	134

Standard errors in parentheses, ***=significant at 1%, **=significant at 5%,*=significant at 10%.

We also ran all regressions without any interaction terms (not reported here) to see whether it is youth unemployment, not general employment, that drives expat jihadism. In none of the model

specifications was youth unemployment significant, but it carried regularly the expected positive sign. Only the interaction term of youth unemployment with the Muslim population share is significant.

It is important to state again that our interaction term of the Muslim population share and youth unemployment does not measure youth unemployment among the Muslim population per se, but is a proxy for economic grievance among Muslims. Again, there is strong case study evidence that youth unemployment rates among Muslims are above aggregate youth unemployment levels in Western countries. Youth unemployment is also a distinct problem in Arab countries.

While our findings contradict the results of Benmelech and Klor (2016) as far as the role of unemployment is concerned, many of our results are in line with their findings. Unexpectedly, our results also support with considerable statistical significance the puzzling finding that countries with higher per capita incomes and less income inequality send more foreign fighters. The exception is model VI, where multicollinearity with the regional fixed effects may be responsible for the lack of significance. This finding may reflect that while many developed countries have low levels of income equality due to post tax redistributive measures keeping vulnerable segments of the population economically safe, if these redistributive measures coincide with a sense of hopelessness among the vulnerable, redistribution is no safeguard against their radicalization.

We also get an unexpected sign for the economic profile variable "MSExpShr," except for model specification VI. The variable, however, is not significant in any of the model specifications. The democracy variable (Polity) does carry the expected sign, but is not significant in any specification. Lastly, the variable good governance (GovX) carries again the unexpected positive sign, and is even significant in model VI. We would explain this series of unexpected signs as closely related to our explanation why more equality seems to drive more people into expat jihad. Eventually, income equality, manufactures and export shares, good governance, and democracy are all positively correlated.

5. **Conclusions**

The discussion about the push factors behind the flow of foreign fighters into Syria is unresolved and filled with riddles. One particular issue of controversy is the role of economic grievance, especially the role of unemployment. Some scholars find support for the hypothesis that unemployment is a driver of expat jihadism, others reject this idea. Different studies, of course, use different samples and different methodologies and it will still take some time until a predominant opinion is solidified with evidence. Our paper contributes to this discussion by supporting the unemployment-matters-camp.

According to our empirical model, both youth unemployment in Muslim countries and youth unemployment among Muslims in Western countries are a strong predictor of expat jihadism. Youth unemployment among Muslims therefore serves as an early warning indicator which should receive particular policy attention, regardless of the region of the world.

As Muslim youth unemployment, at least in our study, is a universal driver of expat jihadism, the policy implications are very different for Muslim states and Western countries where Muslims are a minority. Muslim states face the problem of providing access to economic opportunities to everyone, Western countries with a minority Muslim population face a problem of successful integration and assimilation.

As far as the Western states are concerned, the problems is indeed far beyond pure economics. Is Muslim youth unemployment the result of Muslim immigrants' inability to assimilate in a culturally different society, or is it because Western states fail to develop successful integration strategies? Whatever it is, our paper strongly indicates that jobs to young Muslims is to expat jihadism what is water to fire.

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6. **Data Appendix**

Obs	Country	WB Code	Region	Arab	FF	FFCtry	y	Gini	yuer	Muslim	Polity	GovX	MSEXPSHR	Pop
1	Albania	ALB	EECA	0	90	1	3897.131	28.96	29.2	82.1	9	-0.225	28.13	2894475
2	Algeria	DZA	MENA	1	200	1	3390.933	35.33	20	98.2	2	-0.835	2.641	38934334
3	Angola	AGO	SSA	0	0	0	2063.922	42.72	10.5	1	-2	-1.067	1.06	24227524
4	Argentina	ARG	LAC	0	0	0	7663.728	42.28	21.3	2.5	8	-0.362	6.421	42980026
5	Armenia	ARM	EECA	0	0	0	2362.461	31.54	35.1	0.1	5	-0.169	13.924	3006154
6	Australia	AUS	EAP	0	100	1	37834.53	34.94	13.1	1.9	10	1.564	5.825	23490736
7	Austria	AUT	WE	0	100	1	41000.13	30.48	9.2	5.7	10	1.531	46.978	8534492
8	Azerbaijan	AZE	EECA	0	0	0	3275.714	16.64	13.6	98.4	-7	-0.704	6.346	9537823
9	Bangladesh	BGD	SA	0	0	0	747.371	31.98	9.1	90.4	1	-0.918	1.965	1.59E+08
10	Belarus	BLR	EECA	0	0	0	4998.281	26.01	12	0.2	-7	-0.835	34.739	9470000
11	Belgium	BEL	WE	0	440	1	38210.34	27.59	23.6	6	8	1.368	83.002	11225207
12	Benin	BEN	SSA	0	0	0	671.428	43.44	1.7	24.5	7	-0.34	1.175	10598482
13	Bolivia	BOL	LAC	0	0	0	1409.747	48.06	5.2	0.1	7	-0.549	5.379	10561887
14	Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	EECA	0	330	1	3440.805	33.04	57.5	41.6	0	-0.242	26.701	3817554
15	Brazil	BRA	LAC	0	0	0	5852.5	52.87	15.2	0.1	8	-0.027	5.657	2.06E+08
16	Bulgaria	BGR	EECA	0	0	0	5031.272	36.01	25.9	13.4	9	0.123	39.702	7223938
17	Burkina Faso	BFA	SSA	0	0	0	510.554	39.76	5	58.9	0	-0.49	0.539	17589198
18	Burundi	BDI	SSA	0	0	0	152.653	33.36	10.7	2.2	6	-1.11	4.835	10816860
19	Cabo Verde	CPV	SSA	0	0	0	2743.419	47.19	18.8	0.1	10	0.494	36.145	513906
20	Cambodia	KHM	EAP	0	0	0	749.551	30.76	0.9	1.6	2	-0.735	79.141	15328136
21	Cameroon	CMR	SSA	0	0	0	1024.021	42.82	6.7	18	-4	-0.932	6.581	22773014
22	Canada	CAN	NAM	0	100	1	38258.75	33.68	13.4	2.8	10	1.598	16.75	35540419
23	Central African Republic	CAF	SSA	0	0	0	226.436	56.24	11.9	8.9	0	-1.577	0.293	4804316
24	Chad	TCD	SSA	0	0	0	766.384	43.32	10.5	55.7	-2	-1.276	0.426	13587053
25	Chile	CHL	LAC	0	0	0	9853.531	50.45	16.4	0.1	10	1.174	8.452	17762647
26	China	CHN	EAP	0	300	1	3862.917	42.06	10.5	1.8	-7	-0.545	24.821	1.36E+09
27	Colombia	COL	LAC	0	0	0	4657.754	53.49	18.9	0.1	7	-0.307	4.547	47791393
28	Comoros	COM	SSA	0	0	0	596.886	55.93	10.6	98.3	9	-0.861	12.723	769991
29	Congo, Dem. Rep.	ZAR	SSA	0	0	0	283.467	42.1	11.9	1.4	5	-1.57	0.83	74877030
30	Congo, Rep.	COG	SSA	0	0	0	2066.863	40.16	10.7	1.6	-4	-1.075	15.951	4504962
31	Costa Rica	CRI	LAC	0	0	0	6188.144	49.18	19.2	0.1	10	0.642	30.936	4757606
32	Cote d'Ivoire	CIV	SSA	0	0	0	1079.718	43.18	5.8	36.9	4	-0.884	10.23	22157107
33	Croatia	HRV	EECA	0	0	0	10547.22	31.98	45.9	1.3	9	0.432	34.801	4238389
34	Cyprus	CYP	WE	0	0	0	21852.09	34.31	35.7	22.7	10	0.997	36.522	1153658
35	Czech Republic	CZE	EECA	0	0	0	14955.2	26.13	16.7	0.1	9	0.861	78.741	10510566
36	Denmark	DNK	WE	0	100	1	47525.35	29.08	12.4	4.1	10	1.781	39.56	5639565
37	Dominican Republic	DOM	LAC	0	0	0	5249.585	47.07	31.4	0.1	8	-0.284	10.707	10405943
38	Ecuador	ECU	LAC	0	0	0	3808.713	47.29	10.8	0.1	5	-0.578	3.932	15902916
39	Egypt, Arab Rep.	EGY	MENA	1	360	1	1466.985	30.75	42	94.7	-4	-0.908	5.178	89579670
40	El Salvador	SLV	LAC	0	0	0	3247.22	43.51	11.7	0.1	8	-0.156	25.129	6107706

41	Estonia	EST	EECA	0	0	0	12382.07	33.15	17	0.1	9	1.084	68.104	1313645
42	Ethiopia	ETH	SSA	0	0	0	315.759	33.17	7.1	33.8	0	-0.911	0.401	96958732
43	Fiji	FJI	EAP	0	0	0	3900.647	42.78	18.6	6.3	2	-0.602	41.242	886450
44	Finland	FIN	WE	0	50	1	38802.75	27.12	19.2	0.8	10	1.846	28.919	5463596
45	France	FRA	WE	0	1200	1	35666.6	33.1	23.9	7.5	9	1.157	24.716	66206930
46	Gabon	GAB	SSA	0	0	0	7469.584	42.18	35.5	9.7	3	-0.488	1.65	1687673
47	Gambia, The	GMB	SSA	0	0	0	445.812	47.33	10.6	95.3	-5	-0.612	0.887	1928201
48	Georgia	GEO	EECA	0	0	0	2254.385	40.03	34.1	10.5	7	0.206	27.41	4504100
49	Germany	DEU	WE	0	500	1	39891.54	30.13	7.6	5	10	1.466	37.295	80889505
50	Ghana	GHA	SSA	0	0	0	763.938	42.77	3.3	16.1	8	0.076	6.85	26786598
51	Greece	GRC	WE	0	0	0	18255.72	36.68	53.9	4.7	10	0.309	20.024	10957740
52	Guatemala	GTM	LAC	0	0	0	2357.038	52.35	5.4	0.1	8	-0.619	12.396	16015494
53	Guinea	GIN	SSA	0	0	0	295.292	33.73	1.7	84.2	4	-1.183	1.685	12275527
54	Guinea-Bissau	GNB	SSA	0	0	0	420.194	50.66	11.1	42.8	6	-1.34	2.262	1800513
55	Guyana	GUY	LAC	0	0	0	1559.429	44.55	23.8	7.2	6	-0.4	11.971	763893
56	Haiti	HTI	LAC	0	0	0	492.203	60.79	17.1	0.1	0	-1.064	7.711	10572029
57	Honduras	HND	LAC	0	0	0	1661.507	53.67	6.9	0.1	7	-0.683	13.07	7961680
58	Hungary	HUN	EECA	0	0	0	11932.61	30.55	21	0.3	10	0.649	81.243	9861673
59	India	IND	SA	0	0	0	1233.949	33.9	10.4	14.6	9	-0.35	18.326	1.3E+09
60	Indonesia	IDN	EAP	0	0	0	1853.808	35.57	21.8	88.1	9	-0.352	10.589	2.54E+08
61	Iran, Islamic Rep.	IRN	MENA	0	0	0	3541.428	37.35	29.4	99.7	-7	-1.121	2.986	78143644
62	Iraq	IRQ	MENA	1	0	0	2438.562	29.54	34.6	98.9	3	-1.356	1.311	34812326
63	Ireland	IRL	WE	0	30	1	52252.35	32.52	25.8	0.9	10	1.415	90.669	4612719
64	Israel	ISR	MENA	0	0	0	24600.86	42.78	11	17.7	10	0.617	32.81	8215300
65	Italy	ITA	WE	0	80	1	28451.12	35.16	44.1	2.6	10	0.497	24.991	61336387
66	Jamaica	JAM	LAC	0	0	0	4111.76	45.46	30.5	0.1	9	0.022	22.74	2721252
67	Japan	JPN	EAP	0	0	0	37595.17	32.11	6.5	0.1	10	1.306	15.563	1.27E+08
68	Jordan	JOR	MENA	1	1500	1	2878.216	33.66	28.8	98.8	-3	-0.16	36.256	6607000
69	Kazakhstan	KAZ	EECA	0	250	1	5580.892	26.35	3.5	56.4	-6	-0.682	5.017	17289111
70	Kenya	KEN	SSA	0	0	0	658.705	48.51	17.4	7	9	-0.673	9.657	44863583
71	Kyrgyz Republic	KGZ	EECA	0	100	1	637.262	27.37	14.7	88.8	7	-0.794	20.774	5834200
72	Latvia	LVA	EECA	0	0	0	9671.247	35.48	19.3	0.1	8	0.705	40.952	1990351
73	Liberia	LBR	SSA	0	0	0	226.237	36.48	4.6	12.8	6	-0.792	10.412	4396554
74	Lithuania	LTU	EECA	0	0	0	11107.79	35.15	21.5	0.1	10	0.825	53.278	2929323
75	Luxembourg	LUX	WE	0	0	0	82960.1	34.79	16	2.3	10	1.704	157.566	556074
76	Macedonia, FYR	MKD	EECA	0	12	1	3979.188	44.05	50.8	34.9	9	-0.055	46.36	2075625
77	Madagascar	MDG	SSA	0	0	0	271.593	40.63	5.2	1.1	6	-0.812	6.274	23571713
78	Malawi	MWI	SSA	0	0	0	274.346	46.12	13.8	12.8	6	-0.413	2.109	16695253
79	Malaysia	MYS	EAP	0	0	0	7365.239	46.26	6.7	61.4	5	0.388	57.07	29901997
80	Mali	MLI	SSA	0	0	0	458.225	33.04	10.5	92.4	5	-0.801	1.295	17086022
81	Mauritania	MRT	SSA	0	0	0	876.817	37.48	46.6	99.2	-2	-0.862	4.49	3969625
82	Mauritius	MUS	SSA	0	0	0	7116.594	35.84	21.2	16.6	10	0.808	39.776	1260934
83	Mexico	MEX	LAC	0	0	0	8521.892	48.07	9.9	0.1	8	-0.158	24.566	1.25E+08

84	Moldova	MDA	EECA	0	0	0	1190.7	28.53	8.5	0.4	9	-0.296	25.683	3556400
85	Mongolia	MNG	EAP	0	0	0	1882.38	33.75	9.3	4.4	10	-0.181	7.243	2909871
86	Morocco	MAR	MENA	1	1500	1	2546.594	40.72	20.2	99.9	-4	-0.345	13.822	33921203
87	Mozambique	MOZ	SSA	0	0	0	535.726	45.58	40.7	22.8	6	-0.519	11.369	27216276
88	Nepal	NPL	SA	0	0	0	426.413	32.75	4	4.2	6	-0.823	9.231	28174724
89	Netherlands	NLD	WE	0	200	1	43361.6	27.99	11.1	5.5	10	1.682	59.582	16854183
90	Nicaragua	NIC	LAC	0	0	0	1453.807	45.73	7.6	0.1	9	-0.532	18.159	6013913
91	Niger	NER	SSA	0	0	0	293.188	31.45	7.1	98.3	6	-0.714	0.372	19113728
92	Nigeria	NGA	SSA	0	0	0	1098.04	42.97	13.6	47.9	4	-1.149	0.626	1.77E+08
93	Norway	NOR	WE	0	60	1	67228.41	25.9	8.4	3	10	1.811	12.869	5136475
94	Pakistan	PAK	SA	0	500	1	813.706	29.59	8.6	96.4	7	-1.125	10.464	1.85E+08
95	Panama	PAN	LAC	0	0	0	8209.832	51.67	11	0.7	9	0.061	23.323	3867535
96	Papua New Guinea	PNG	EAP	0	0	0	1193.021	43.88	5.4	0.1	5	-0.626	10.792	7463577
97	Paraguay	PRY	LAC	0	0	0	2093.744	48.3	9.3	0.1	9	-0.644	5.815	6552518
98	Peru	PER	LAC	0	0	0	4123.582	44.73	9.2	0.1	9	-0.245	5.573	30973148
99	Philippines	PHL	EAP	0	0	0	1662.074	43.04	16.4	5.1	8	-0.319	23.735	99138690
100	Poland	POL	EECA	0	0	0	11257.6	32.39	24	0.1	10	0.835	36.414	37995529
101	Portugal	PRT	WE	0	0	0	18391.39	36.04	36.8	0.6	10	0.957	32.11	10397393
102	Romania	ROM	EECA	0	0	0	6256.515	27.33	25.1	0.3	9	0.144	34.701	19910995
103	Russian Federation	RUS	EECA	0	800	1	6843.925	41.59	12.9	11.7	4	-0.712	7.514	1.44E+08
104	Rwanda	RWA	SSA	0	0	0	445.616	51.34	0.7	1.8	-3	-0.122	7.189	11341544
105	Senegal	SEN	SSA	0	0	0	813.503	40.28	13	95.9	7	-0.189	7.575	14672557
106	Serbia	SRB	EECA	0	50	1	4245.538	29.65	49.5	3.7	8	-0.101	9.996	7129428
107	Sierra Leone	SLE	SSA	0	0	0	513.418	33.99	4.9	71.5	7	-0.692	4.665	6315627
108	Slovak Republic	SVK	EECA	0	0	0	15797.52	26.12	31.1	0.1	10	0.705	78.754	5418506
109	Slovenia	SVN	EECA	0	0	0	19170.21	25.59	20.8	2.4	10	0.854	72.463	2062218
110	Solomon Islands	SLB	EAP	0	0	0	1119.192	46.1	9.5	0.1	8	-0.448	11.56	572171
111	South Africa	ZAF	SSA	0	0	0	6086.446	63.38	52.6	1.5	9	0.229	14.953	54001953
112	Spain	ESP	WE	0	50	1	25259.7	35.89	57.9	2.3	10	0.811	25.713	46404602
113	Sri Lanka	LKA	SA	0	0	0	2058.95	38.58	19.1	8.5	3	-0.353	18.247	20639000
114	Sudan	SDN	SSA	1	100	1	972.753	35.39	23.3	71.4	-4	-1.615	1.896	39350274
115	Suriname	SUR	LAC	0	0	0	4663.256	57.61	17.9	15.9	5	-0.057	3.249	538248
116	Sweden	SWE	WE	0	150	1	46066.75	27.32	22.8	4.9	10	1.803	31.44	9689555
117	Syrian Arab Republic	SYR	MENA	1	0	0	1648.81	35.77	30.1	92.8	-9	-1.687	20.036	22157800
118	Tajikistan	TJK	EECA	0	190	1	507.389	30.77	15.5	99	-3	-1.198	10.716	8295840
119	Tanzania	TZA	SSA	0	0	0	588.319	37.78	5.5	29.9	-1	-0.453	9.871	51822621
120	Thailand	THA	EAP	0	0	0	3768.788	39.26	3.9	5.8	-3	-0.299	58.754	67725979
121	Togo	TGO	SSA	0	0	0	429.779	46.02	10.7	12.2	-2	-0.964	17.633	7115163
122	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	LAC	0	0	0	14369.3	40.27	10.6	5.8	10	0.094	24.509	1354483
123	Tunisia	TUN	MENA	1	1500	1	3953.424	35.81	31.8	99.8	7	-0.287	35.697	10996600
124	Turkey	TUR	WE	0	600	1	8864.743	40.17	17.7	98.6	9	-0.079	20.152	75932348
125	Turkmenistan	TKM	EECA	0	360	1	3873.768	40.77	20.2	93.3	-8	-1.355	5.935	5307188
126	Uganda	UGA	SSA	0	0	0	435.493	42.37	6.8	12	-1	-0.602	11.239	37782971

127	Ukraine	UKR	EECA	0	50	1	2081.056	24.55	16.9	0.9	4	-0.715	33.692	45362900
128	United Kingdom	GBR	WE	0	500	1	41489.63	32.57	16.7	4.6	10	1.399	22.829	64510376
129	United States	USA	NAM	0	100	1	46405.25	41.06	14	0.8	10	1.21	9.959	3.19E+08
130	Uruguay	URY	LAC	0	0	0	8016.681	41.87	19.1	0.1	10	0.774	10.485	3419516
131	Venezuela, RB	VEN	LAC	0	0	0	6088.027	46.94	17.1	0.3	4	-1.312	0.579	30693827
132	Vietnam	VNM	EAP	0	0	0	1077.909	38.7	6.3	0.2	-7	-0.515	61.355	90730000
133	Yemen, Rep.	YEM	MENA	1	110	1	709.469	35.89	29.9	99	0	-1.334	7.683	26183676
134	Zambia	ZMB	SSA	0	0	0	1032.803	55.62	25.1	0.4	7	-0.226	6.306	15721343

Legend:

Obs	Observation Number
Country	Country Name
WB Code	World Bank Three-Letter Code
Region	Regional Dummy where EAP=East Asia and the Pacific, EECA=Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA=Middle East and North Africa, NAM=North America, SA=South Asia, SSA=Sub Saharan Africa, and WE = Western Europe
Arab	Dummy for Arab Country ("1" if yes, "0" otherwise)
FF	Foreign Fighters per Million
FFCtry	Dummy for "Foreign Fighter Sending Country" ("1" if yes, "0" otherwise)
y	GDP per capita ($2005)
Gini	Gini Index
yuer	Youth unemployment rate
Muslim	Muslim population share
Polity	Polity2 Score
GovX	Good Governance
MSEXPSHR	Manufacturing and services export (% GDP)
Pop	Population